#HEGELIAN DIALECTIC DEFINITION FREE#

To have a unity is to have a concept, and this regards any and all forms of unities regardless of how abstract, concrete, mental, or material they are. Д¬oncepts are for Hegel, to put it concisely, structures of unity, and at their most concrete they are developmental unities. Further, this self-development of a concept is logic itself, i.e. This self-development is considered in an ideal self-containment, and this mirrors a structure of independence many consider to be the privilege of objectivity.

HegelвЂ™s logical method and its truths are intimately tied with concepts - in fact, the method is ultimately nothing but the concept of the self-development of concepts from simple abstractness to complex concreteness. The question of real objects is ultimately a question about the true concepts which we can know them as. With this distinction a limitation of Hegelian logic will appear, but such a limitation is also the opening for its fruitful use. First, let us consider the ideal logic of necessity found in Hegelian philosophy, afterward our natural logic, and finally the link between both. To find the place of HegelвЂ™s logic (dialectics) in our own cognition the delineation of what I shall call here necessary concepts of logical nature and contingent concepts of natural existence must be made, and in treating things in this way we can strike two birds - concept and object - with one stone. We are here not interested in mere concepts, however, but also with concepts of objects.

#HEGELIAN DIALECTIC DEFINITION FREE#

The intelligent and free concepts, those consciously developed by philosophical logic, are firmly tied by their own internal necessity. Instinctive (natural) logic generates as its concepts (categories) objects which are more or less firmly tied here and there by an external necessity in messy knots. To purify these categories and in them to elevate spirit to truth and freedom, this is therefore the loftier business of logic.вЂќ - Science of Logic В§21.16 As impulses the categories do their work only instinctively they are brought to consciousness one by one and so are variable and mutually confusing, thus affording to spirit only fragmentary and uncertain actuality. Here and there on this web there are knots, more firmly tied than others, which give stability and direction to the life and consciousness of spirit they owe their firmness and power simply to the fact that, having been brought before consciousness, they stand as independent concepts of its essential nature. вЂњThe broad distinction between instinctive act and act which is intelligent and free is that the latter is performed consciously. Hegel is well aware of the difference and notes: They fail to make a distinction between the exercise of HegelвЂ™s philosophical logic and our common natural logic. But it is not pedantry alone that is their error, a confusion underlies the incapacity to see where this logic is rightly deployed. What these errant enthusiasts fail to understand is something that may seem obvious: That pedantic presentation does not an intelligent conception make. These confusions are in part simple naivete which flexes its cognitive muscles in a mistaken pride of conquering such a famed logical method, but there are not so obvious issues which lead to this error and they deserve clarification. Hegelian logic is great after all, what could be better than absolute concepts and arguments? Is there anything at all that HegelвЂ™s logic could not enlighten us about, nothing which we should not eagerly process through its almighty speculative lens? So called вЂdialecticsвЂ™ have become strangely privileged by some, mainly Marxists, as a logical and conceptual form which supposedly says something important, and yet more often than not attempts to use this method result in the obtuse mystification of what is common and obvious.

Hegelian dialectic definition